Published: 29 March 2024
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New evidence supports the hypothesis of a staged event in Moscow.
On March 25, SPR published a first forensic video analysis and concluded that the March 22 Moscow concert hall “terrorist attack” may have been a staged false-flag event. Since then, additional evidence has emerged that adds further support to this hypothesis, while none of the arguments provided in the original analysis have so far been invalidated.
Initial analysis and responses
To recap, the initial analysis revealed multiple anomalies that are suggestive of a staged event, including:
- most video footage is of unusually low video quality;
- not a single execution by gunfire can be seen anywhere;
- shattering glass doors are mostly due to people, not gunfire;
- some people appear to survive close-range gunfire unscathed;
- the gunfire shows an unusual, movie-like “sparking effect”;
- not a single victim can be seen up close in high resolution;
- multiple “bodies” exhibit postures that are very difficult or even impossible to explain physiologically, but that are typical of simulation bodies (i.e. manikins);
- the supposed “beheading video” shows no beheading at all, but does show multiple anomalies that are suggestive of a simulation body and video editing;
- the entire building burnt down but no large-scale arson can be seen;
- the video of a “severed ear” does not show the “severing” of the ear;
- several “amateur videos” appear to have mid-sequence cuts;
- at least two staged events previously occurred on a March 22.
From a technical perspective, the first point alone is already rather strong evidence of a staged “terrorist attack”: video footage far below current cellphone camera standards is highly unusual under normal circumstances, but is very typical of staged “terrorist attacks”, since even a single high-quality photograph or video frame can expose an entire staged false-flag operation.
So far, none of the points raised in the initial analysis have been explained or invalidated. One reader proposed “rigor mortis” (postmortem rigidity) to explain the stiff posture exhibited by many bodies (including elevated hands and knees), but rigor mortis begins only four hours after death and cannot explain these observations (see images below).
Some readers invoked the victims reported by Russian authorities and media, but such victims are reported after every staged “terrorist attack”. Previous events showed that victim identities can be real or virtual. If they are real, they may or may not have died; if they died or were injured, it occurred in other circumstances. Severely injured victims are often played by so-called amputee actors (e.g. in Boston). In some cases, bodies of actual dead people were used in staged events (e.g. in the 1994 Sarajevo âmarketplace massacreâ and the 1999 âRacak massacreâ in Kosovo).
Other readers questioned the Russian motivation behind a staged false-flag operation. The initial analysis highlighted a possible foreign-policy or military motivation, notably an escalation of the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine. While this remains a real possibility, the political and media response in Russia suggests an additional but domestic motivation: the strengthening of Russian “anti-terror” laws and the reintroduction of the death penalty.
More generally, conflating the analysis of possible motivations with the analysis of the event itself is a common mistake. The motivations behind a staged terrorist attack can be multifaceted and complex. Different groups may try to leverage such events for different purposes (e.g. reducing immigration vs. increasing surveillance). In some cases, an intended response cannot be implemented (e.g. when Russia in 2013 prevented a US military response to false-flag chemical attacks in Syria).
Another common mistake is to focus on the narrative (who said what and why) instead of the “crime scene” evidence, which usually requires a forensic frame-by-frame video analysis. In state-run and staged “terrorist attacks”, the narrative is mostly fictional and often confusing and contradictory (by design). In contrast, most staged events have been exposed by spotting small production mistakes captured in authorized or unauthorized footage or photographs.
Many pro-Russia and especially pro-Putin readers obviously didn’t like the SPR analysis very much (“utter nonsense”). One reader argued that the short video about the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings cited in the analysis doesn’t prove it was a false-flag operation run by Putin’s FSB to escalate the Chechen War. But the short video is only the introduction: the video notes refer to two in-depth analyses of these bombings that provide overwhelming evidence of an FSB operation. An additional documentary in the SPR Media Archive provides even more evidence.
Finally, some readers wondered if the supposed treatment of the supposed “terrorists” by Russian security forces doesn’t contradict the hypothesis of a staged event. But as already mentioned in the original analysis, previous staged “terrorist attacks” had much more spectacular “manhunts” that supposedly resulted in shootouts and deaths (e.g. in Boston). In general, information about supposed “terrorists” is mostly part of the soft narrative and not part of the hard evidence.
New evidence
Since the publication of the initial SPR analysis, new evidence has emerged that further supports the hypothesis of a staged false-flag operation run by Russian security forces.
First, many Russian commentators have noted that it took Russian security forces over an hour to reach and enter the Crocus City Hall, despite the fact that they were stationed nearby. Such a delay is highly unusual from a public order perspective, but it is very typical of staged “terrorist attacks” (the staged “Manchester Arena bombing” on 22 May 2017 being a classic example).
Second, many commentators have wondered how the entire building could burn down so quickly and so completely. The initial SPR analysis already highlighted the fact that no footage of large-scale arson by the supposed attackers seems to exist. Some new video evidence suggests the fires may have started before the “terrorists” even entered the theater hall.
Moreover, Russian authorities have still not released any CCTV footage of the event. In previous staged events, authorities sometimes claimed that CCTV cameras were âmalfunctioningâ, or they released irrelevant, low-quality or even doctored CCTV footage. As the 2016 âISIS car bombingâ in Baghdad showed, a single unauthorized CCTV video can expose an entire staged operation.
Third, a former RT editor noted that in the background of one video, two men appear to be chatting calmly right next to the ongoing mass shooting. One of them may even hold a camera in his hands. While people react very differently to mass shootings and other emergencies (some do not realize what is going on or they assume they won’t be affected), this intriguing observation is of course consistent with the hypothesis of a staged event coordinated and filmed by Russian operatives.
Fourth and most intriguingly, Belarusian-Polish pro-Western media outlet Nexta spotted multiple plain-clothed âmen in blueâ who appear to have played a coordinating role during the âterrorist attackâ (see images below). The next day, one of them seems to have participated in the arrest of a âterroristâ near the Ukrainian border; another one was presented as a âheroâ by Russian media; and a third one appears to work for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).
While Nexta believes this shows Russian intelligence services may have orchestrated a real attack on innocent Russian concert hall visitors (not very likely), the participation of such color-coded operators and coordinators is of course typical of staged events (e.g. the famous “red shoes” in the staged Westminster attack on 22 March 2017). Thus, this observation appears to provide further evidence for the hypothesis of a fully staged operation run by Russian security forces.
All of this new evidence has been added as an update to the original analysis.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the currently available evidence continues to support the hypothesis that the March 22 Moscow concert hall attack may have been a staged event run by Russian security services. However, additional evidence may still change this assessment or add new aspects.
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You have been reading:
Moscow “Terrorist Attack” (3/22): New Evidence in Favor of a Staged Event
A preliminary analysis by Swiss Policy Research
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Update
- Moscow attack: “Has everyone been fooled?” (May 2024)
Video clips of the event (18+)
- (18+) Videos of the attack (SouthFront)
- (18+) âBeheading videoâ (SouthFront)
- (18+) âSevered ear videoâ (Telegram)
- (18+) Patient in helicopter (Telegram)
- (18+) Bellum Acta (Telegram channel)
The “men in blue” (Nexta)
The “men in blue” identified by Belarusian-Polish media outlet Nexta. Sources: A, B, C.
The two “calmly chatting” men (ES)
Two men apparently “chatting calmly” next to the mass shooting. Source: ES
Key video snapshots (SPR, 18+)
The following images show some of the key video snapshots of the Moscow concert hall attack. All of the images use the highest resolution currently available to the authors of this analysis. Most images have been enlarged, some have been brightened. (18+)
Video: Miraculous shooting survivors (18+)
A group of people apparently surviving close-range gunfire unharmed (zoomed in) (Source)
Simulated wounds in staged terrorist attacks
Silicon sleeve wounds (i.e. moulage) used during the staged 2013 “Boston Marathon bombing”. Source: The Boston Unbombing (2016 documentary)
Photorealistic simulation bodies (18+)
A photorealistic manikin used during the staged 2013 Kenya shopping mall attack. Right-click on the images to enlarge them. Sources: video analysis and newspaper article.